

26 APR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Strategic Programs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Papers from Andy Marshall

1. Following up on our conversation with Andy Marshall, he tells me that he has sent you some papers on his survey of what drives the foreign perception of the strategic balance. He has also sent me two papers which I am attaching.

25X1      2. [REDACTED] perceptions in 1973. It's the kind of product we might come to by canvassing our Chiefs of Station country by country. Andy talked to me by phone and encouraged us to go ahead with that aspect of our problem. At the same time, he pointed out that if we do this on too wide a basis at a single time it may, in fact, generate adverse political reaction. If too many countries sense that we are concerned about their attitudes and perceptions, they may feel we are in an uncertain state ourselves. Accordingly, I think we need a game plan to do this on a gradual basis, sampling different groups of states separately, dividing them geographically by ideology and by economic status, or else we are going to have to be very careful as to what kind of instructions we give our Chiefs of Station.

3. The second paper, which is a letter by [REDACTED] is very interesting. I am quite intrigued by paragraph 1(e). It suggests the desirability of a critique of what our political/military behavior and pronouncements have been. I'm not sure whether it's best explored in your shop or elsewhere within NFAC, but I think we might play a role in this one. We could only do so by developing the critique as seen by the Soviet Union or by our allies or by others. It seems to me we could make a very important contribution if we could do this well.

[REDACTED]

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

E2-IMPDET

[REDACTED]